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SUMMARY
EMPLOYMENTEFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE
This paper describes an empirical study of the effects
of federal minimumwagepolicy on aggregate employment, on
the employment of various demographic groups, and on employment
in low-wage industries. The analytical framework permits
separate testing both for direct employment effects of the
level and coverage of the minimum wage and for indirect
employment effects resulting from a possible role for the
minimum wage as a cause of monetary nonneutrality. Another
innovation in this study is the inclusion of rational
expectations of expected future relative minimum wages as
determinants of the demands and supplies of labor services.
The study finds that minimum-wage policy seems not to
affect aggregate employment or average wages either directly
or indirectly. Minimum—wage policy, however, has large and
statistically significant effects on the industrial and
demographic composition of employment, with employment
decreasing in certain low-wage industries and for teenagers
and for young men but increasing for young women and for
adults. A major part of these effects are associated
with anticipated future changes in the level of the minimum
wage.
John Boschen Herschel Grossman
Federal Reserve Board Department of Economics
Research and Statistics Brown University
Washington, DC 20551 Providence, RI 02912
(401)863—2606or —2144This paper describes an empirical study of the effects of
federal minimum wage policy on aggregate employment, on the
employment of various demographic groups, and on employment in
low—wage industries. The analytical framework permits
separate testing both for direct employment effects of the
level and coverage of the minimum wage and for indirect
employment effects resulting from a possible role for the
minimum wage as a cause of monetary nonneutrality. The
implementation of these tests involves the estimation of
reduced form equations that use monetary variables, in contrast
to the usual reliance on endogenous variables such as aggregate
output, to distinguish the employment effects of minimum
wage variables from the employment effects of macroeconomic
disturbances. Another innovation in this study is the
inclusion of expected relative minimum wages in the near and
distant future, in addition to the current relative minimum
wage, as determinants of the demands and supplies of labor
services, together with the assumption that the expectations
of both workers and employers about future relative minimum
wages are "rational."
To summarize briefly the main results, the study finds
that minimum wage policy seems not to affect aggregate
employment or average wages either directly or indirectly.
Minimum-wage policy, however, has significant effects on
the industrial and demographic composition of employment, with
employment decreasing in certain low—wage industries and for
teenagers and for young men but increasing for young women
and for adults. A major part of these effects are associated
with anticipated future changes in the level of the minimum wage.
An earlier paper published bytheMinimum Wage Study Corn-
mission-—see Boschen and Grossman (1981)--reported preliminary
results that were consistent with these findings, but were
ambiguous in some respects. The present study uses a full-
information maximum-likelihood estimation procedure and—2—
analyses a comprehensive set of equations for employment of
demographic groups. These improvements provide a more complete
picture and firmer conclusions about the effects of minimum-
wage policy. In what follows, Section 1 sets up the
theoretical model, Section 2 solves the model, Section 3 describes
the data used in the empirical analysis, Sections 4, 5, and 6
describe the estimation of the aggregate wage and employment
equations, the employment equations for demographic groups, and
the employment equations for low-wage industries, and Section 7
presents conclusions.
I.Analytical Framework
The point of departure for the theoretical analysis is the
division of labor markets into one subset in which the minimum
wage is an effective constraint on the wage rate and another
subset in which the wage rate is free to adjust to equate
quantities supplied and demanded. The presumption that since
the establishment of the federal minimum wage the subset of
constrained markets has not been empty is based on the
observation that the wage distribution has continually
exhibited a cluster at the level of the federal minimumwage.
The first part of the theoretical framework specifies the
supply and demand functions for labor services in the subset
of constrained markets and the proximate determination of
employment and excess supply in these markets. This specifica-
tion involves the determination of behavior in the representative
market in the subset of constrained markets and, also, the
determination of the size of this subset. One basic assumption
is that the ratios of supply and demand in the representative
constrained market to rtqgregate supply and demand depend on
the past ratio of employment in that market to aggregate
employment, on the current ratio of the average wage rate to
the minimum wage, on rational expectations of the ratio of
the average wage rate to the minimum wage in the near and
distant future, and on time trends. The importance of past
employment and expected future relative wages reflects
mobility costs for supply and technological adjustment costs—3—
for demand. The assumption that expectations are rational
means that workers and employers behave as if their beliefs about
future wages and policy actions are equal to the true mathe-
matical expectations implied by the current and past levels of
these variables and by the economy's stochastic structure.
Another basic assumption is that the number of constrained
markets depends positively on the current ratio of the
minimum wage to the average wage and on the current ratio of
employment covered by the minimum wage to aggregate employ—
merit. For simplicity, this assumption treats this coverage
ratio as strictly exogenous to the markets for labor services,
although it actually depends on the chosen distribution of
employment and on the size distribution of firms in addition
to depending on the legal designation of covered employment.
Incorporating these basic assumptions into log—linear
supply and demand functions for the subset of constrained











wherethe variables are defined as follows:
NS, Nd, and N are the logs of supply, demand, and actual
employment, respectively, in the subset of constrained markets.
LS, Ld, and L are the logs of aggregate supply, demand,
and actual employment, respectively.
Each of these quantity variables is measured as a fraction
of the working-aged population.
W is the log of the average wage rate.
is the log of the minimum wage rate.—4—
C is the log of the ratio of employment covered by
the minimum wage to aggregate employment.
b and y are random variables with zero means. All random
variables in the model are assumed to be normally distributed
and uncorrelated with other random variables.
The subscripts date the variables. The empirical implemen-
tation of the model uses a periodicity of one year.
Et is an operator that designates a currentlyformed
rational expectation.
Theoretical considerations suggest that the elasticity
coefficients in equations (1) and (2) are all unambiguously
d ci s
positive with the exception of n, n, and n. The ambiguity
with regard to nd arises because an increase in the current
ratio of the average wage rate to the minimum wage rate
increases demand in the representative constrained market but
decreases the number of constrained markets. A plausible
ci s quantitative supposition, however, is that the sum of n and n
is positive. Another plausible quantitative supposition is
that nS is larger than nd, because, when the subset of
constrained markets expands due to an increase in coverage,
the newly constrained markets add more to supply than to
demand. For simplicity, the analysis assumes that nis
d s d
equal to nand that nis equal to n .Theempirical 0 5 5
analysis treats the elasticity coefficients as constants.
Actual employment in the subset of markets in which the
minimum wage is an effective constraint is equal to demand




where X is the log of the ratio of supply to employment in
the subset of constrained markets. The presumption that
since the establishment of the federal minimum wage this subset
has not been empty implies that X has been positive over
this period.
Note that the variable X, does not correspond to the
measured concept of unemployment. The analysis does not con—
sider the choice that persons who are not employed make between
the alternatives of active search for acceptable employment
and nonparticipation in the labor force and, hence, does
not attempt to explain measured unemployment.
The second part of the theoretical model specifies the
aggregate supply and demand for labor services and the
proximate determination of aggregate employment and average
wages. The specification of aggregate supply involves a
distinction between aggregate notional supply, already repre-
sented by LS, and aggregate effective supply. Aggregate
notional supply measures the level of employment that would
be accepted by workers if they could obtain employment in
the markets that they prefer, given the current and expected
future structure of wage rates. The analysis assumes that
aggregate notional supply is an exogenous variable that grows
at an exogenous rate and is subject to random disturbances.
Specifically,
(5)L=A+r5t+X
where A and rS are constants
and A is a random variable with zero mean.
In the present context, actual aggregate supply differs
from aggregate notional supply because the minimum wage causes
demand to be an effective constraint on employment in some
markets. Aggregate effective supply equals aggregate notional
supply less that part of excess notional supply in the subset
of constrained labor markets that does not result in increased—6—
effective supply in the unconstrained labor markets. Specifically,
we assume the log—linear form,
(6)L =L
—aX
where LSis the log of aggregate effective supply and a
is the elasticity of the ratio of aggregate effective supply to
aggregate notional supply with respect to the ratio of supply
to employment in the subset of constrained markets. The present
analysis treats a as a constant.
The plausible range for a is from zero to exp (Nt—Lb)
A value of a of exp (Nt-Lt)would mean that effective
supply in unconstrained markets is independent of excess
supply in the subset of constrained markets. The opposite
extreme, a value of a of zero, would mean that effective
supply in unconstrained labor markets increases one—for-one
in response to excess supply in the subset of constrained
labor markets. This response could involve either decisions
by affected low-productivity workers in constrained markets
to seek alternative employment in unconstrained markets or
decisions by other individuals, who otherwise would not choose
to be employed, to seek employment. The existing literature
has not emphasized the second type of response, the replacement
in the labor force of individuals for whom the minimum wage
is an effective constraint by other individuals. Such a
replacement could reflect either an income effect resulting
from the inability of certain family members to obtain
employment or a substitution effect resulting from higher
demand and higher relative wages for workers who can
substitute for low-productivity workers.
The specification of aggregate demand involves the form of
an equation of exchange with employment velocity depending
positively on productivity growth, which the econometric analysis
represents as a simple time trend, and on the expecLed rate of—7—






where M is the log of the money stock,
Vis the log of employment velocity,
and v are constant coefficients,
and is a random variable with zero mean.
The final assumption regarding the proximate determination
of aggregate employment is that the average wage adjusts to
equate aggregate demand with aggregate effective supply, i.e.,
(8) Lt =L
=L.
This aggregate market—clearing assumption means that any
excess supply in the subset of constrained markets that wants
alternative employment in unconstrained markets can obtain
such employment. Thus, in this model, although the minimum
wage depresses employment in the subset of constrained markets,
any effect of minimum—wage policy on aggregate employment
depends on being positive--that is, on the effect that
inability to obtain employment in the subset of constrained
markets has on aggregate effective labor supply. In addition,
this aggregate market-clearing assumption implies, as is
verified by the calculations below, that any effect of monetary
policy on aggregate employment also depends on cibeing
positive. Thus, this model generates the testable hypothesis
that the setting of the minimum wage as an effective constraint
provides the critical linkage between monetary variables
and aggregate employment.
The third part of the theoretical model specifies minimum-
wage policy and monetary policy. Minimum-wage policy includes—8—
the determination of the level and the coverage of the minimum wage in
boththe short run and the long run. The history of federal minimum-wage
legislation suggests the following observations:(a) The law
has specified future time paths for the nominal minimum wage and
for coverage criteria.(b) The law has been amended at intervals
ranging from four to seven years.(c) These amendments have
raised the relative minimum wage to between 46% and 56% of the
average manufacturing wage rate and have steadily removed
coverage exemptions.(d) Between amendments, the relative minimum
wage has declined to between 40% and 47% of the average manufac—
turing wage rate.
These observations suggest that a policy objective has been to
avoid large variation in the relative minimum wage and to expand
coverage, but that policy execution has not been precise. In light
of these observations, it would seem appropriate to characterize
minimum—wage policy as allowing, at least implicitly, periodic
review and possible adjustment of future nominal minimum wages and
coverage, with the objective being to equate on average the
expected relative minimum wage and coverage to given target levels.
We suppose that the expectations on which this policy is based are
"rational," but not necessarily always correct. The failure to
achieve the policy objectives precisely results, in this formula-
tion, from imperfect foresight and from random factors that influence
the carrying out of policy.
This representation of minimum—wage policy assumes that current
and near-future policy variables--, t+l' C, and C+1--are
currently predetermined and known exactly. The distant future
level of the minimum wage is determined according to
t+iEt+...i W1 +
+ for alli =2,3,4, ...,
wherey is the constant long-run policy target for the log of
ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage rate and wis
a random variable with zero mean. The policy target, y, does
not represent necessarily the level at which the relative minimum
wage is set when the Fair Labor Standards Act is amended.
Rather, it is the desired mean over time of the level of the—9—
nominal minimum wage relative to expectations of the average wage.
The random policy error, w, results from stochastic factors that
affect either the timing of amendments to the law or the level at
which the minimum wage is set when the law is amended. In
incorporating the rational expectations of the future average
wage, equation (9) attributes the same form of rationality to
minimum—wage policy as to labor supply and demand behavior.
The distant future coverage of the minimum wage is determined
according to
(10) =C1_1
+c+ forall i =2,3,4,
where c is the constant long—run target growth rate for
coverage and Uis a random variable with zero mean.
Taking expectations of equation (9)yields
Et(2t+± —Et+iW+1) =yfor all i =2,3,4,...,
whichimplies
(9.1) Et(Qt+± —Wt+.)
=yfor all i =2,3,4
Taking expectations of equation (10) yields
(10.1) EtCt+ =C÷_+cfor all i =2,3,4
These expressions imply that for the distant future, which in
this analysis means after next year, it is rational to expect
the minimum wage to be adjusted in line with average wages and
for coverage to increase at a constant rate.
Monetary policy includes the determination of the current
money stock and of future increases in the money stock.
Observation of the actual formulation and reporting of monetary
policy suggests that a reasonable simplification is to treat
the current money stock as predetermined and known exactly, an
assumption that contrasts sharply with the assumption of
incomplete monetary information made in many macroeconomic
models that incorporate rational expectations. With regard
to the prediction of the future money stock, extensive— 10—
experimentswith a variety of models suggest that a parsimoniously
specified univariate time series is not unrealistic. In
particular, we specify an AR(1,l) process,
(11)
where rn measures money growth, i.e., m+ =Mt+±
z and g are constants, and p is a random variable with
zero mean. An advantage of this model is that it explains a
substantial portion of observed money growth with the addition
of a minimum number of parameters to the analysis. Taking
expectations of equation (11) gives




These expressions imply that rational expectations of
future monetary policy involve an autoregression on current
and past monetary policy.— 11—
2. Solution of the Model
Econometric analysis of the model given by equations (1) (11)
requires a solution that expresses the endogenous variables--the
average wage rate, aggregate employment, and employment in the
subset of constrained markets--as depending on minimum-wage policy,
on monetary policy, and on any other relevant predetermined
variables. The procedure followed is to obtain such a solution
for W ,andthen to use this result to derive solutions for L. t t
and for Nt-Lt.
Combining equations (1) -(8)gives, after some algebraic
manipulation, the following expression for as a function of
expected future values of the average wage rate, policy variables,
and other exogenous variables:
(i) W =K{(l—c) [Mt +(rd_rS)t+vEtWt+i+ A—




Substitutingthe known values of near—future minimum-wage policy
and the expected value of the distant—future relative minimum wage,
from equation (9.1) ,intoequation (i) gives
(ii)W =K{(1—a)[Mt +(rd_rS)t +vEtwt+i
+ —A—
s d s d + a[(n + —
(n2+ n) (EtWt+i—t+i)
s s d + (.n +n)y+ (n —n)C + 13 -y ]}.
3 3 1 Lt t t
In equations (1) and (ii) ,expectationsof future average wage
rates affect W. through two channels. First, the term, VEtWt÷iV
reflects the effect of expected inflation on velocity. This— 12—
termproduces a positive effect on W. Second, the terms,
(nS + d)Et(Wt+i-Qti) and(nS +d)Et(Wt+2—2t+2) ,reflect
the effects of expected future relative wages on supply and
demand in the subset of constrained markets. If ctis positive,
these terms produce negative effects on W.
To obtain an expression for that we can implement
empirically, we use the method of undetermined coefficients to
solve out for these effects of expected future average wage







+HM +Hm + H t+ H (c—X)+H(13—y),
7 8tt 9tt
where H ,..., H are coefficients to be determined.The
0
objective of solving out for EtWt÷i suggests the inclusion of
the variable, m1, which according to equation (11.1) is a
determinant of expected future money growth, as well as the
variable, The other variables in equation (iii) either




(iv) =II+II t+ + H (Et÷iWt÷2—Qt+2) + 110t+l + llCt+2
+ llMt+i + + H(t+l)+
+ '
Taking a rational expectation of equation (iv) and using
equations (9.1) ,(10.1),(11.1),and(11.2) gives
(v) EtWt+i =11+ ++ HC+II(Ct÷i+ c)
+ fl(Mt + z + grn)+fl(z + gm) + 1T(t+1).— 13—
Thiscalculation of EtWt÷l sets the current expectations of
the future values of the stochastic variables equal to their
zero means and relates current and future expectations according
to the example, Et(Et÷2Wt+2) =EtWt+2.
To obtain the solution for W, we substitute into equa-
tions (ii) and (iii) the value of EtWt+i given by equation (v).
These substitutions give two equations for that have the
same form,
(vi) A +AQt +AHt+i + ACt +
+AM +Am +At+c(W)
7 t
Equating the coefficient of each variable in equation (ii) with
the coefficient of the same variable in equation (iii) yields
the following system of equations:
A H + TI [H +11 y + H c + (II +H )z + II
0 0 2 0 2 5 6 7




A =1T(H—l)=K[(1—)vll+(5d) (1-fl H
A=ft=Kcz(nS_nd)
A =H(fl+H) +H K(ll+fl) [(l—)v —
A (1+11)11 =K[(1—a)(l+vH) —a(nS+nd)fl]
Afl(ll+fl)g +
6= K(H+ll)g[(l—)v-
A=(1+11)H =K[(l—a)(rd_rS+vfl )— c1(n5+nd)flI
7 27 7 2 7 7— 14—
+fl(—)K[(l—c)(t—Xt) +
Althoughthis system of equations is not linear in
II...H,its structure permits a recursive solution that
eliminates these undetermined coefficients and yields uniquely











Theconstant term, A ,isa linear combination of the constants
0
A,y, c, and z.
Inspection of these expressions reveals that, if (iS
positive,A and A are positive but less than unity, A and A
are also positive, and the sign of A and A is the same, but is
ambiguous. Although both C1 and m have positive effects n
EtWt+i, A and A involve the net result ofthe positive
effect of EtWt+i on aggregate labor demand, which has a
positive effect on and the positive effect of EtWt+i
demand and employment in the subset of constrained markets,
which has a negative effect on W. Alternatively, if ci.is
zero, A ,A,A,andA are zero, A equals unity, and A is
1 2 3 5 6
positivebut less than the parameter, v. The sign of A is
generally ambiguous, because this coefficient involves offsetting— 15—
effectsof trends in supply and demand. The final term, c(W)i
is stochastic and, being a linear combination of the random
variables in the structural equations, has mean zero.
To obtain the solution for Lti we substitute into
equation (7) the values of from equation (vi) and EtWt÷i
from equation (v) and substitute into equation (8) the value
of Lt from equation (7). Referring to the expressions for
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2 —1 B =(l+v)A (1 +v—gv) 6 2
ds s B =(r-r )B +r
7 5
and(L)t -(l+v) c(W) ÷
The coefficients, B ...B,of equation (vii) are all
linear functions of the coefficients of equation (vi). The
stochastic term, E(L)t, is a linear function of e(W)ts and
also has mean zero. These cross-equation relations result
from the form of the aggregate demand equation and from the
tssumpt.ions of aggregate market clearing and rational expectations.— 16—
Withregard to the signs of B ...B,if c.is positive,
B and B are negative, B ,B,andB are positive, and B and B
1 3 '+ 5 6
11
areambiguous. If o.is zero, all of these coefficients,
except B, are zero.
To obtain the solution for Nt-Lti we substituteinto equa-
d . d
tion (2) the values of Nt from equation (3), from equa-
tion (8), W, from equation (vi) ,EtWt+1
from equation (v) ,and
Et(Wt+2-t+2) from equation (9.1) .Referringto the expressions





















Thecoefficients, D ...D,of equation (viii) are also
linear functions of the coefficients of equation (vi) and the
stochastic term, E(N)t is also a linear function of
with mean zero.With regard to the signs of D ...D,
regardless of the value of a, Dis negative, D, D, and D
are positive, and D is ambiguous. If a is positive, D, D,
and D are ambiguous. If a is zero, D is negative, D is
b 2 II
zero, and D is positive.
The solutions given by equations (vi) ,(vii),and(viii)
show how the model focuses attention on the behavioral parameter
a. This parameter, introduced in equation (6), measures the
effect that excess supply in the subset of markets in which the
minimum wage is an effective constraint has on aggregate labor
supply. First, the size of a determines the extent to which
the minimum wage variab1es--Q +' C., C+1--have a positive
effect on the average wage rate and an associated negative effect
on aggregate employment. If a were equal to zero, a value
that would mean that excess supply in the subset of constrained
markets causes a one-for—one increase in employment in uncon-
strained markets, the average wage rate and aggregate employment
would be independent of minimum-wage policy. In this case, the
sole effect of minimum-wage policy would be to reduce the proportion
of aggregate employment that occurs in the subset of markets in
which the minimum wage is an effective constraint.
Second, the size of a determines the extent to which the
monetary variables--M and me--are not fully absorbed in the
average wage rate and, hence, have a positive effect on aggregate
employment. If a were equal to zero, the elasticity of
with respect to Mt would be equal to unity, the elasticity of W
with respect to m would be positive but less than the
parameterv, and Lt would be independent of both Mt and
In this case, the sole real effect of expansionary monetary
policy would be to increase the proportion of aggregate— 18—
employmentthat occurs in the subset of markets in which the
minimum wage is an effective constraint.
A related observation about the theoretical results is
that regardless of the value of a, the sum of coefficients
A +A+Ais unity and that the sums of coefficients
1 2 5
B+B+Band D +D+Dare zero. These summations
1 2 5 1 2 5
meanthat equiproportionate increases in 'i'and Mt
would produce an equiproportionate increase in and no changes
in Lt and Mt. These implications about the interaction
between monetary policy and minimum-wage policy reflect the
property of the present model, which is tested empirically
below, that the setting of the minimum wage as an effective
constraint in a subset of markets is the only source of
monetary nonneutrality. This property results directly from
the assumed equality of aggregate demand and aggregate
effective supply, as specified by equation (8).
Equations (vi), (vii), and (viii) provide a basis for
testing of derived hypotheses, for quantification of
empirical relations, and for the interpretation of empirical
observations. Most importantly, the econometric results
discussed below indicate that the data do not reject the
hypothesis that the effects of minimum wage variables reflect
a value of equal to zero, but that the data reject the
hypothesis that the effects of monetary policy on employment
result from the existence of the minimum wage.
3.Data
The econometric analysis requires the development of
empirical proxies that conform as closely as possible to
the theoretical constructs. The endogenous variables are
the average wage rate, W, total employment, Lti and minimum—
wage employment, Nt.As an empirical proxy for we use
average hourly earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers— 19—
onprivate payrolls in manufacturing, calculated by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics from its establishment survey. This
series is the most inclusive average wage measure that excludes
the effects both of fluctuations in overtime premiums and of
changes in the proportion of workers in high-wage and low-wage
industries.This series also seems appropriate as the
measure of average wages because, as noted above, minimum—wage
policy appears to be targeted in relation to the average
manufacturing wage rate. Experiments carried out with other
wage series, such as average wages adjusted for nonpecuniary
benefits, did not substantially alter the results.
As an empirical proxy for Lti we use the total number
of civilians employed, calculated by the BLS from its
household survey. This measure of employment conforms most
closely to the data that we use to estimate the effects of
minimum wage policy on demographic groups, thereby allowing
a comparison between disaggregated estimates and the
estimates for aggregate employment. Experiments with other
measures of total employment, such as total hours worked,
did not yield substantially different empirical conclusions.
The most difficult data problem is that no time series
are available that correspond to the theoretical conceptNt.
Our strategy, therefore, is to focus on measures that appear
to involve a high incidence of minimum—wage employment.
(See Welsh (1978) for a discussion of wage distributions.)
One such measure is the number of teenagers (16-19 years old)
employed, calculated from the BLS household survey. Teenagers
are the demographic group reporting the highest incidence of
minimum—wage employment. In addition, in order to obtain a
complete picture of the effects of minimum-wage policy on the
distribution of employment among demographic groups, we also
use as dependent variables measures of the numbers of young
persons (20-24 years old) employed and adults (over age 24)
employed. In order to consider the possibility of male—female— 20—
orwhite—nonwhite differences in the effects of minimum-wage
policy, we divide teenagers and young persons by sex, and
we divide adults and the sum of teenagers and young persons
by sex and race. Tests using finer demographic divisions
were not productive, a result that may be attributable to small
sample sizes and large measurement errors for these groups.
Another measure possibly involving a high incidence of
minimum—wage employment is the number of production or non-
supervisory workers on private payrolls in those
SIC two digit industries that report relatively low average
wages. These data are calculated from the BLS establishment
survey and, thus, are not directly comparable to the data on
aggregate employment and employment of demographic groups
from the household survey. Nevertheless, the industry data
enhance our picture of the effects of the minimum wage.
We consider nine low—wage industries: Lumber and Wood Products,
Furniture and Fixtures, Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries
(which include jewelry), Food and Kindred Products, Tobacco
Manufactures, Textile Mill Products, Apparel and Other Textile
Products, Leather and Leather Products, and Retail Trade.
With the exception of Apparel and Other Textile Products and
Retail Trade, these industries represent the two-digit
industries that reported average wage rates below $1.10 in 1947.
We included Apparel and Other Textile Products because the
average wage rate in this industry was low relative to the
above industries throughout the latter part of the sample
period. We included Retail Trade because of the large coverage
increases that occurred in retail employment and the rela-
tively low average wage rate in this industry during the latter
part of the sample period.
One problem with using these data series to infer the
effects of minimum-wage policy on minimum-wage employment
is that only a fraction of employment in any demographic group
or industry, including teenagers or low—wage industries, is— 21—
atthe minimum wage. Consequently, estimated elasticities of
employment in these categories with respect to minimum—wage
variables would tend to understate the effects of minimum—wage
policy on minimum—wage employment.
Another problem is that each one of these industries,
as well as the demographic group of teenagers, accounts for
only a small fraction of total minimum-wage employment.
Consequently, it seems appropriate to interpret these data to
be measures of employment in individual markets in the subset
of constrained markets, rather than total employment in this
subset. Thus, increases in the coverage of the minimum wage
can depress employment as measured by these data even though
increases in coverage presumably increase total minimum wage
employment.
The exogenous variables in the model are the current
and near-future level of the minimum wage, and the
current and near—future minimum—wage coverage ratio, C and
and current level and rate of change of the money stock, Mt and m4
The measure of and is the log of the federal minimum
wage from published data of the Employment Standards Administra-
tion. The measure of C and from unpublished ESA data,
is the log of the average of the estimated ratios of covered
workers to total employment of production and nonsupervising
personnel in the following industries: Construction,
Transportation and Public Utilities, Wholesale Trade, Retail
Trade, and Services. Almost all of the legal coverage changes
over the sample periods were in these industries. The measure
of the money stock is M1B per working person.
As indicated above, each of the employment variables is
measured as a logarithm of a fraction of the working-aged
population. All of the data employed are annual averages. In
theestimatedequations for employment of demographic groups,
available data on the dependent variables limits the sample— 22—
periodto 1954 through 1981. For consistency the estimated
equations for average wages and aggregate employment use
the same sample period. The inclusion of and among
the independent variables and allowance for a possible
first—order autoregressive structure on the residuals mean
that all of these equations are fitted to observations of
the dependent variable from 1955 through 1980. In the
estimated equations for employment in low—wage industries,
the sample period is from 1947 to 1980.
4. Estimation of Average Wage and Aggregate Employment
Equations
We estimate the equations for W and Lt jointly using
the full-information maximum-likelihood procedure in the
RESINUL program. This program selects coefficient values by
employing the Newton-Raphson iterative method to find the
maximum ofthe concentrated likelihood function.
See Wymer (1978)for a full description of this estimation
procedure.
To test the various hypotheses associated with the
equations for and Lt, we use a likelihood-ratio
statistic calculated as follows: Let S be the maximized value U
of the likelihood fnctiort under unconstrained estimation and
let be the maximized value of the likelihood function when k
parameters are constrained during estimation. The test
statistic k =—2log(0/e) is 2-distributed with k
degrees of freedom.
Because of the possibility of multiple local maxima in
the likelihood function, we used three different sets of
initial guesses for the parameters to start the estimation.
The guesses were a vector of zeros, a vector of unit values,
and the single equation OLS estimates of the parameters.
Because theestimateswere essentially invariant to these— 23—
differentinitial guesses, we report only the estimates
associated with the zero vector of starting values.
To deal with first—order serial correlation in the
residuals, we estimated the coefficient of the auto-
regressive disturbance term, denoted as p,simultaneously
with the rest of the parameters. The sample residuals did
not show significant evidence of higher-order serial
correlation in either equation.
The estimated equation for the average waqe rate is
(I) -1.7 +•°t+ .06+i -00C






Hypothesis: A +A=0, =2.0,Pr(i > ) =.16
Hypothesis: A = A=A=A 0, L= 4.2,Pr( > i )= .38
1 2 3 1
Hypothesis:A +A+A=1, i,Lz12.6,Pr(ji ) =.01.
2 5 1 1
Thenumbers in parentheses under the coefficients are the t—ratios.
The statistics reported after each indicated null hypothesis
are the computed value of the test statistic, '1'k' and the proba-
bility of finding under the null hypothesis a value of k greater
than the computed value.
One clear implication of equation (I) is that minimum-wage
variables do not have a statistically significant effect on
average wages. The estimated coefficients on and t+l are
positive, but the t-values indicate that neither of these
coefficients is significantly different from zero. In addition,
the likelihood-ratio test of the hypotheses A +A=0
indicates that the total effect of current and near-future
minimum wages is not significant at either the 5% or 10% level.— 24—
Similarly,although the estimated coefficients of C and
are negative, the associated t values indicate that neither
of these coefficients is significantly different from zero at
the 5% level.(The coefficient of however, is
significant at the 10% level, a result that foreshadows a
puzzling finding about C1 in the equation for aggregate
employment.) Finally, the likelihood ratio test for
A =A=A=A=0confirms that the date do not reject
1 2 3
the null hypothesis that the minimum-wage variables all
have no effect on the average wage rate. All of these results
have in common the implication that we cannot reject the
hypothesis that c,the parameter that measures the effect
of excess supply in the subset of constrained markets on
aggregate employment, is zero.
The estimated coefficient of Nt in equation (I) and
the associated t-value indicate that the current money stock
has a significant positive effect on the average wage rate.
Moreover, although the point estimate and estimated standard
error seem consistent with the hypothesis that this
coefficient equals unity, the likelihood ratio test for
A + A + A =1indicates that the data reject this
1 5
null hypothesis at the 1% level. This implication that the
effects of ' andMt do not sum to unity is
inconsistent with the theoretical model specified above.
Specifically, this finding means that monetary policy is
not neutral. However, the conclusion drawn above that
the data do not show that c.differs from zero suggests that
minimum-wage policy and the role of monetary policy in
determining the real value of the preset nominal minimum wage
do not account even in part for this nonneutrality.
The estimated coefficient on m in equation (II) iridi-
cates that current monetary growth has a significantly
negative effect on the average wage rate. This result provides
an additional reason for rejecting the implication of the— 25—
modelthat. a value of a close to zero would produce monetary
neutrality.










R2 =.99 p =.05
(0.4)
Hypothesis: B =B=B=B 0, 'p 8.8, Pr(ip > 'p) =.08
1 2 4 4
Hypothesis: B =B=B=0, 'p=3.2,Pr('p 'p )= .34
1 3 3
Hypothesis: B +B+B=0, 'p 20.5, Pr('p >'p)= .01.
1 z 5 1 1
The general impression from equation (II) is that minimum
wage variables do not have a statistically significant effect on
aggregate employment. The estimated coefficients on and
are positive, contrary to what the theory implies, but the
t—values indicate that neither of these coefficients are
significantly different from zero. The estimated coefficient
on is negative, but also not significantly different from
zero. Similarly, the likelihood-ratio test for B =B=B=0
confirms that the data do not reject the hypotheses that
' andC. all have no effect on aggregate employment.
These findings are consistent with the results in equation (I).
The implication again is that we cannot reject the hypothesis
that a is zero.
A problematical aspect of equation (II) ,forwhich we
have no obvious explanation, is that the estimated coefficient
of C1 is positive and, according to the t-value, is
significant at the 5% level. Associated with this result,
the likelihood-ratio test value for B =B=B=B=0,
1 2 326 —
issignificant at the 8% level. These findings are not con—
sistent with the conclusions drawn above, because the
theoretical analysis implies that, if c.is zero, the
coefficient of like the coefficients of the other minimum—
wage variables in equations (I) and (II) ,shouldbe zero.
Note also that the point estimate for the coefficient of
in equation (II) is consistent with the point estimate for
the coefficient of in equation (I), given thatthe other
coefficientsare zero.
The estimated coefficient of Mt in equation (II) and
the associated t-value indicate that the currency money
stock has a significantly positive effect on aggregate
employment. The likelihood ratio test for B + B + B 0,
which rejects this hypothesis at the 1% level, is
consistent with this finding of monetary nonneutrality.
This result is also consistent with the effect of 0'
found in equation (I).
We also performed likelihood-ratio tests of the relations,
implied by the theoretical analysis, between the coefficients
B ...Bof the aggregate-employment equation and the
coefficients A, A, and Aof the average—wage equation.
The data do not reject any of the individual relations at
the 5% significance level, but they reject the relations
associated with B ,B,andBat least the 10% level, and
2 '+ 5
they reject the null hypothesis that all of these relations
hold at the 1% significance level. These results are not
surprising in light of the findings from the econometric
analysis of the two individual equations and do not seem to
have any important implications beyond those already drawn.— 27—
Forexample, given that the unconstrained estimate of B, the
coefficient of in equation (II) ,isinconsistent with
the unconstrained estimates of the coefficients of the other
minimum-wage variables in equation (II) we should expect
the data to reject the cross—equation relation between
A ,A,andB .Also,given that the data reject the within-
2 3 4
equation relations between A, A, and Aimplied by the
theorywe should expect that they would reject the implied
relation between A ,A,andB
1 2 5
5.Estimation of Employment Equations for Demographic Groups
Table 1 reports the estimates of the equations for the
employment of the various demographic groups relative to
aggregate employment. We estimate these equations individually,
but for consistency with the estimated aggregate employment
equation we use the same maximum—likelihood
procedure in the RESIMUL program. The only evidence of
first—order serial correlation was in the equation for
employment of female nonwhite adults. The estimates reported
in this case use p =-.56as a correction. In the equation
for employment of nonwhite males, the value of R2is .83.
In all of the other equations, the value of R2 is .97 or
higher.
In Table 1, the columns headed by each independent variable
report the estimated coefficients of this variable and the
t-statistics in parentheses. In all of the equations, Wald
tests of the null hypotheses D =D=0and D =D=0,
1 2
not reported in the table, confirmed the implications about
statistical significance drawn from the t—statistics. The
columns headed by D + D0, D + D =0,and
1 2 3 4
D+ D + D =0report the values of the Wald test for each
1 2 5
of these null hypotheses with an asterisk indicating that
the test value is significant at the 5% criterion level.— 28—
TheWald test statistic is specified as follows: Let
(D) be the maximum likelihood estimate of thecovariance
matrix of the estimated coefficients, D, and let Zbe a
transformation matrix containing the k coefficientrelations
to be tested. The test statistic, k =(ZD—ZD)'(Z(D)Z')1(ZD—ZD)
is v-distributed with k degrees of freedom.The Wald test
statistic eases the computational probleminvolved in testing
multiple hypotheses because it does not requirerecalculation
of the constrained residual covariance matrix. SeeBerndt and
Savin (1977)for a comparison of the Wald and the likelihood-
ratio test statistics.
An immediate observation from Table 1 is thatthe estimated
coefficients of in the equations for young persons, teenagers,
and the sums of young persons and teenagers are inthe line
with the estimates for employment effects of the currentminimum
wage reported in other studies. See,for example, Gramlich
(1976) ,Ragan(1977) ,andHamermesh (1981) .Afuller examination
of the results in Table 1, however, provides a more complete
and somewhat different picture of these effects. The
estimated coefficients of and theassociated t-values,
and the Wald tests for D + D =0indicate that together
1 2
thecurrentand near-future levels of the minimum wage have
negative employment effects that are statisticallysignificant
for males aged 20-24, for females and males aged 16—19,and
for white males aged 16-24. For each of these male groups,
the estimated coefficients indicate that a 10% increasein both
and would cause about a 2.8% decrease in employment,
a much larger effect than estimated in studiesthat have looked
only at the current minimum wage, and alsoindicate that the
bigger part of this effect is associated with A 2.8%
decrease in employment represents about 138,000 males aged
20—24, 85,000 males aged 16—19, and 198,000 white males









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































indicateabout a 2.4% decrease in employment, which represents
about 59,000 persons in this group.
The statistics relating to the effect of and on
the employment of nonwhite males aged 16—24 are somewhat
puzzling. The estimated coefficients for this group are negative
and imply that a 10% increase in both ftand would decrease
employment by about 2.4%, which corresponds to about 23,000
persons in this group.This number equals within the margin
of rounding errors the number implied by the estimated effects
for the other male groups. However, both the t-values and
the Wald test of D ÷ D =0for the equations for nonwhite
males aged 16-24 indicate that the data do not reject the
hypotheses that the coefficients of and are zero.
The results in Table 1 indicate that the effects of the
level of the minimum wage on employment differ markedly by
sex within each age group except teenagers. For employment of
females aged 20-24, the negative coefficient of is
significant, but the positive coefficient of is larger
and is also significant, and the Wald test implies rejection
of the null hypotheses D + D =0.The estimated coefficients
1 2
for this group indicate that a 10% increase in and t+l would
increase employment by 1.2%, corresponding to about 45,000
persons. This finding is consistent with the suggestion of
Gramlich (1976) and Grant and Hamerrnesh (1981) ,also
supported by the results in Table 1 on females over age 24,
that employment of oldcr females replaces at least in part
the employment of younger males. For the employment of both
white and nonwhite females aged 16—24, the Wald tests
indicate that the data do not reject the null hypotheses
D + D =0.This finding suggests that the increased employ-
ment of young women roughly balances any decreased employment
of female teenagers.— 31—
Theseresults for the effects of the level of the
minimum wage lead to three novel conclusions: First, the
relatively clear findings for the male groups and mixed
findings for the female groups suggest that the disemployrnent
effects are concentrated on young males. Second, the
relative importance of the coefficients of t+l suggest that
these effects involve significant changes in labor demand
in anticipation of future changes in the level of the minimum
wage. Third, the combined effect of current and near-future
levels of the minimum wage on the employment of teenagers
and young men is much larger than the effect of the current
minimum wage alone estimated in other studies.
Turning to the effect of current and near—future levels of
the minimum wage on the employment of persons over age 24,
the results in Table 1 indicate that the coefficients on
are positive and significant for nonwhite females and white
males and that the coefficients on are positive and
significant for white females and nonwhite males. Moreover,
the Wald tests indicate that for all four groups the data
reject the null hypotheses D +D=0.For the groups over
age 24, the estimated coefficients indicate that a 10%
increase in both and would cause approximate increases
in employment of 0.7% (about 130,000 persons) for white
females, 0.6% (about 17,000) for nonwhite females, 0.3%
(about 110,000 persons) for white males, and 1.1% (about
41,000 persons) for nonwhite males.
If the minimum wage is an effective constraint on employ-
ment in some markets, the finding, from the estimation of
equations (I) and (II), that the level of the minimum wage
has no apparent effect on aggregate employment suggests either
that affected workers take alternative employment in other,
unconstrained markets or that a sufficient number of other
individuals, who otherwise would not choose to be employed,
respond by taking employment. The findings in Table 1 for—32—
the effect of the level of the minimum wage on the employment
of various demographic groups indicate both that
many constrained workers do not takealternative employment
and that the replacement in the workforce of individuals
for whom the minimum wage is an effective constraint to
employment by other individuals for whom theminimum wage is
not a constraint to employment is quantitatively important.
Specifically, females over age 19 and males over age24
apparently enter the workforce to replace females aged16—19
and males aged 16-24.
The results in Table 1 for the effects of minimum-wage
coverage show that estimated coefficientsof C and
are significant for many of the demographic groups. Inmost
cases, however, the coefficients of C. and have opposite
signs and their effects on employment are offsetting.The
Wald tests of D + D =0indicate that the data reject
3
this null hypothesis for only three demographic groups.
Specifically, an increase in both current and near—future
coverage would seem to decrease employmentof nonwhite
females and males over age 24 and would seem to increase
employment of nonwhite females aged 16-24.
The statistics in Table 1 relating to the effects of Mt
and m are consistent with the conclusions drawn from
equations (I) and (II) that monetary policy is not neutral,
but that this nonneutrality does not result from minimum-
wage policy. Equation (viii) derived fromthe theoretical
model indicates that relative employment in the subset of
markets in which the minimum wage is an effective constraint
should be positively related to Mt. In the equations for
employment of males aged 20-24, females and males aged 16-19,
and white males aged 16—24, which are the demographic groups
for which there is a significantly negative relation between
employment and the level of the minimum wage, the positive— 33—
coefficientsof and m are consistent with the theory,
although only the coefficients of m for males aged 16-19 and
white males aged 16-24 are statistically significant. In
the equations for employment of females aged 20—24 and non-
white females, white males, and nonwhite males over age 24,
which are demographic groups for which there is a
significantly positive relation between employment and the
level of the minimum wage, the negative coefficients of Mt
and m are also consistent with the theory. However, the
statistically significant coefficients of Mt for other
demographic groups, negative for white females aged 16—24
and positive for white and nonwhite females over age 24
suggests that monetary policy affects the composition of employ-
ment at least partly for reasons not associated with minimum wage
policy. The Wald tests for D + D + ID =0confirm this
1 2 5
conclusion by rejecting this null hypothesis in every case.
6.Estimation of Employment Equations for Low-Wage
Industries
Table 2 reports the estimated equations for employment in
the nine low-wage industries. The columns headed by each
independent variable report the estimated coefficients of
this variable and the t—statistics in parentheses. We
examined preliminary regressions for serial correlation in
the residuals using 2-tests of the null hypotheses that
the residuals are serially independent. Where necessary, we
used a first-order or a second—order Cochrane—Orcutt
procedure to obtain the final estimated equations. The
columns headed by p and p report the estimated values of
the autoregressive parameters used to correct for serial
correlation in the residuals. The columns headed by
D =D0, D +D =0,andID +D =0 report the
1 2 1 2 3
values of F-tests for these null hypothesis and, in





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































thanthe computed F—values under the null hypotheses. In the
equation for Furniture and Fixtures, the value of R2 is .71.
In all of the other equations, the value of R2 is .98 or
higher.
The regressions reported in Table 2 indicate that either
the current minimum wage or the near-future minimum wage have
a significantly negative effect on employment in seven of
these nine industries. Based on computed t-statistics less
than -1.4, which corresponds to significance at the ten
percent level, we can conclude that an increase in the current
minimum wage depresses current employment in Lumber and Wood
Products, in Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries, in
Tobacco Manufactures, in Textile Mill Products, and in Apparel
and Other Textile Products, and that an increase in the near-
future minimum wage depresses current employment in Furniture
and Fixtures and in Retail Trade. The F-tests for the joint
importance of and and for the total effects of
and t+l indicate that depressing effects on employment are
significant at the six percent level in five industries:
Lumber and Wood Products, Miscellaneous Manufacturing, Textile
Mill Products, Apparel and Other Textile Products, and Retail
Trade. In these five industries, the sums of the estimated
coefficients on and t+l range from -.03 to -.19. It is
worth noting that in no industry did the F-tests indicate a
significantly positive effect of and on employment.
The results reported in Table 2 for the effects on
employment of current or near—future minimum wage coverage are
less clear. We estimated significantly negative coefficients
on C. for Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries, Apparel
and Other Textile Products, and Leather and Leather Products,
and a significantly negative coefficient on C11 for Tobacco
Manufactures, but we estimated significantly positive
coefficients on for Furniture and Fixtures, Food and
Kindred Products, Textile Mill Products, Apparel and Other— 36—
TextileProducts, and Teenage Employment. TheF-test for the
total effect of C and c1 indicatesthat the sum of the
coefficients is significantly negative inMiscellaneous Manu-
facturing and significantly positivein Food and Kindred
Products.
7.ConcluSiOnS
The main conclusions from this studyare the following:
(1) Neither the level nor the coverageof the federal minimum
wage seems to have adirect effect on aggregate employment
or average wages.(2) The level of the minimum wage,however,
has significant and pervasive effects onthe demographic
composition of employment. Specifically,increase in
the current or near—future minimum wage causethe employment
of teenagers and young men to decreaseand cause the employ-
ment of young women and adults toincrease. The empirical
analysis of both aggregate employmentand employment of
demographic groups indicates thatthis replacement of teenagers
and young men in employment by young womenand adults is
approximately one-for-one.(3) A major part of these
effects is associated with the anticipationof future changes
on the level of the minimum wage.The effect of combined
increases in current and near-futurelevels of the minimum
wage is much larger thanthe effect of the current minimum
wage estimated in previousstudies. A ten percent increase in
the level of both the current and near-futureminimum wage
would decrease employment of teenagemales and young men by
about 2.8% and teenage women by about2.4% and involve a
turnover of about 300,000 workers.(4) The employment
reductions associated with the level of theminimum wage
are concentrated in certainindustries that apparently
have a high proportion of minimum-Wageworkers.
(5) changes in the effective coverageof the federal minimum
wage, as estimated bythe Employment Standards Administration,
have effects on the demographic andindustrial composition— 37—
ofemployment that are significant, but limited to nonwhite
demographic groups and a couple of industries. Specifically,
an increase in both current and near-future coverage
decreases employment of nonwhite adult women and men, but
increases employment of the sum of nonwhite female teenagers
and young women.(6) Federal minimum wage policy and,
specifically, the role of monetary policy in determining
the real value of the preset nominal minimum wage, do
not seem to account even in part for the relation
between monetary policy and aggregate employment. Monetary
policy also apparently affects the composition of employment,
but there is also no clear association of this relation
with minimum—wage policy. Monetary nonneutrality results
from other, undetermined factors.— 38—
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